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This report analyzes gender differences in informality and productivity in urban Bolivia. 
Rural Bolivia is excluded from the analysis for three reasons: 1) informality in rural areas is 
close to 100% for both men and women
2, 2) farming is a family business and it is 
impossible to tell if one family member is more productive than another, and 3) data on 
productivity and profitability is too unreliable in rural areas. 
 
The urban labor market in Bolivia can be divided into 4 main sectors: 1) the public sector, 
2) the formal private sector, 3) self-employed informals, and 4) informal workers. Although 
incomes are generally higher in the public sector and in the formal private sector, there is a 
strong preference in Bolivia for being informally self-employed. Two thirds of both men 
and women in urban areas respond that they would prefer to be self-employed rather than a 
salaried employee,




Currently, half of all economically active women in urban areas are informally self-
employed, while this is the case for only one third of men. This implies that women are 
actually closer to the desired state than men, according to their own preferences. The real 
problem for women is not that they are informally self-employed, but rather that the 
profitability of their informal enterprises is low. On average, monthly profits of female 
micro-entrepreneurs is about 40% lower than those of male micro-entrepreneurs.
5  
 
This report uses quantitative information from about 600 micro and small enterprises to 
break down and understand this gender gap in profitability, and the results show that almost 
the whole gap is due to the fact that women operate their businesses on a much smaller 
scale (with less productive capital and fewer employees) than men. 
 
Why do female entrepreneurs operate on a smaller scale? One partial explanation is that 
they do not want to grow, because the business then would loose some of the features that 
make a micro-business particularly attractive for women (not to depend on others, to be 
able to care for children simultaneously, flexible working hours, and daily revenues). When 
asked about what they consider the ideal number of employees for their business five years 
into the future, the average for women is 6.9 compared to 9.2 for men. Single women are 
generally a bit more ambitious than married or cohabiting women (the first would on 
average like 5.3 additional employees, whereas the latter only wants 4.2 extra employees),
6 
which suggests that family obligations may be one of the reasons why women prefer to 
keep their businesses at a relatively small scale. 
 
                                                 
2 As measured by NIT, 94.4% of men and 97.8% of women are informal. Neither men nor women in rural 
areas are affiliated with the pension funds (0.0% in both cases). 
3 MECOVI 2005. 
4 Encuestas & Estudios (2007). 
5 Micro and small business survey carried out by Encuestas & Estudios during March of 2007. 
6 2007 Micro and small business survey.  3
More important, however, is the lack of access to capital. Micro and small businesses 
operated by women have only a third of the operating capital of male operated businesses.
7 
There are two main reasons for this. First, women generally have fewer opportunities to 
accumulate capital, both because their household and reproductive work takes time away 
from paid work, and because they tend to earn less than men when they do work for money. 
Second, they do not have access to credit on reasonable terms. Access by itself is not the 
problem, as there is a very active micro-credit industry in Bolivia, but the terms are so 
unattractive that women try to avoid it if at all possible. The interest rates are high (20-40% 
per year); the group-lending practices increases the risk for the borrower, as they may end 
up paying other group members’ debt also; and they are typically required to assist at 
compulsory training courses twice a month, which is demanding for busy women running 
both a business and a household. Banks offer loans at more reasonable terms, but the 
requirements are difficult for micro-entrepreneurs to comply with (especially proof of a 
monthly pay check) and the risk is large as an entire house is often put up as collateral for 
even a small loan.  
 
The credit terms are the same for both men and women, but women find it more difficult to 
obtain loans because loans are granted not on the basis of an analysis of business prospects 
but rather on the basis of existing incomes and assets, both of which tend to be lower for 
women. 
 
The two main policy initiatives that can help women overcome the capital constraint are the 
following: 
 
1.  Free public child care. This would give women more time for market work and 
thus more opportunities to accumulate capital. 
2.  Subsidized credit for small businesses, based on business prospects. The interest 
rate should be reasonable (6 - 8% per year), the borrowing period sufficiently long 
to be attractive for productive sectors (2-5 years), and the bureaucratic requirements 
minimal (a personal ID, a NIT, tax reports for the last 3 months, a simple business 
plan, and a realistic budget). The loans should be granted on the basis of business 
prospects and expected future earnings, rather than existing assets and incomes, as 
is currently the custom. 
 
Capital and credit is not a binding constraint in all sectors, however. On average, returns to 
additional capital investments are estimated to be relatively high (internal rates of return of 
over 20%) in the food sales sector, the textile clothing sector, and the camelid clothing 
sector. In contrast, they are estimated to be negative for grocery stores and the transport 
sector, which have experienced overinvestment to the extent that the returns to both capital 
and labor in these two sectors have been severely depressed.  
 
Even in the sectors where returns to capital are relatively high, a doubling of productive 
capital would not lead to a doubling of monthly profits. In fact, estimation results show 
strongly diminishing returns to scale, which means that micro-enterprises have little 
incentive to grow. Under the current institutional setup in Bolivia, it makes more economic 
                                                 
7 2007 Micro and small business survey. Real estate excluded.  4
sense to have several identical micro-enterprises in the family rather than one larger 
enterprise, and this is indeed often observed in practice. This is partly due to the 
characteristics of the sectors (for example, several small stores can capture a larger market 
due to the geographical dispersion), but it is mostly due to the tax-system, which becomes 
very demanding, both in terms of bureaucratic procedures and in terms of tax burden, as 
soon as an enterprise grows past a certain threshold. 
  
Under the current institutional set up, micro-entrepreneurs perceive no benefits from 
becoming formal, and indeed estimation results confirm that formality would lower the 
monthly profits of micro-enterprises (less than 3 workers and less than $1000 in operating 
capital) by 30-40%. Slightly bigger firms (3-5 workers), however, may benefit from getting 
a NIT and thus be able to offer facturas to the clients.  
 
In order to encourage more firms to become formal, there would have to be some benefits 
of becoming formal, and at the same time the bureaucratic procedures would have to be 
simplified. Among the most attractive benefits that could be offered are the following: 
 
1.  Subsidized credit to firms with a NIT, as suggested above.  
2.  Free training courses for firms with a NIT. Practical courses that take 
entrepreneurs through all the steps of making a business plan, of setting up an 
accounting system, or of becoming an exporter, for example. 
3.  Free child care facilities for owners and employees of formal firms. 
4.  A public subsidy to maternity leave for firms with a NIT. Currently women are 
underrepresented in the private formal sector, and the ones who do work there earn 
significantly less than men with the same qualifications. This is likely because 
formal firms are required to pay the full costs of maternity leave, which makes it 
more risky and more expensive to hire women. A public subsidy to maternity leave 
would help make women more attractive for the formal sector, and vice versa. 
 
The above mentioned initiatives would have both a direct and an indirect effect on 
formality. Not only do they make formality immediately more attractive, but they also help 
firms grow, and thus more likely to want to become formal. The policies will be 
particularly beneficial for women, as they address constraints that are particularly binding 
for women.  
 
The report finishes with a list of sector specific policy recommendations, of which the most 
important additional recommendations are the following: 
 
1.  Industrialization of camelid wool within Bolivia. Currently the raw material is 
exported to Peru for industrialization and the processed yarn then imported to 
Bolivia for the manufacturing of clothing.  
2.  Development of the tourist industry. This will allow micro-entrepreneurs in many 
different sectors to “export” without all the usual complications of exporting goods. 
3.  Reduce harassment from police and municipal inspectors. This is particularly 
relevant for women in the food sales sector. 
  
  5
1. Introduction and overview 
 
During the last 30 years, the Bolivian economy underwent substantial restructuring from 
strong state-domination to liberalization of trade, privatization of state enterprises, and 
general integration into an increasingly globalized world. This implied that employment in 
the public sector fell from 26.0% of the urban labor force in 1985 to 12.1% in 1997 (Jemio 
2000).  
 
At the same time the country is undergoing the classic demographic transition, which 
implies that an increasing proportion of the population is of working age, and dependency 
burdens are falling systematically so that women do not anymore have to spend the major 
part of their adulthood caring for young children, but can instead participate in the income 
generating activities of the households.  
 
The private sector has no been able to absorb both the workers expelled from the public 
sector and the general increase in work force, implying that salaried employment fell from 
52.8% of the urban labor force in 1985 to 43.5% in 1996. White-collar employment fell 
even more rapidly, from 42.1% in 1985 to 29.9% in 1996. In contrast, self-employment 
increased from 47.2% in 1985 to 56.5% in 1996 (Jemio 2000). 
 
Due to the later insertion of women 
in the labor market, and the marked 
differences in gender roles, men and 
women occupy different positions in 
the labor market. Table 1 shows that 
women are much more likely than 
men to be informally self-employed, 
whereas they are underrepresented in 
the formal private sector.  
 
This is not necessarily a problem. 
Both men and women in Bolivia indicate a strong preference for being self-employed. 
Two-thirds of both men and women in urban areas respond that they would prefer to be 
self-employed rather than a salaried employee
8, and very few think it is an advantage to be 
formal
9. This means that women are actually closer to the desired state than men, according 
to their own preferences. 
 
From the viewpoint of society, however, it may not be optimal for the economy to be 
dominated by tiny, informal businesses. For example, informality hampers the possibilities 
for reaping economies of scale, which may be important in some sectors (probably most 
important in export sectors, less important in local service sectors). Informal firms may also 
have difficult access to financing at reasonable conditions, which may imply a sub-optimal 
level of investment in productive capital. Finally, informality erodes the tax-base and limits 
                                                 
8 According to the MECOVI 2005. 
9 According to focus group interviews carried out by Encuestas & Estudios (2007).  
Table 1: Distribution of the urban labor force across 
sectors, by gender (%) 
Sector Men  Women
Informal worker  23.7  15.1
Informal self-employed  33.0  49.8
Formal Private  34.0  23.9
Public 9.4  11.3
Total 100.0  100.0
Note: Formality is defined as having a tax identification 
number (NIT). 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the 2005 MECOVI.  6
the government’s options for creating a sustainable source of revenues for public spending 
and investment (World Bank 2007). 
 
In this study we focus on identifying constraints to productivity growth among micro and 
small enterprises in urban Bolivia, with special attention to gender differences. The results 
will help us formulate policy recommendations on how to increase the incomes of the 
poorest segments of the urban population within the current institutional setup. 
 
We also include an analysis of the constraints to becoming formal in order to formulate 
policy recommendations on how to change the institutional setup to encourage formality in 
the medium to long run. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is a descriptive section that 
puts the productivity of men and women in the urban informal sector into perspective, 
using information from the 2005 MECOVI household survey. This allows us to identify 
particularly disadvantaged groups, and by comparing their incomes to other population 
groups we will get an idea of how much room there is for improvement. 
 
After describing the context of informal men and women in urban Bolivia, Section 3 
proceeds with an analysis of constraints to productivity growth, with special attention to 
gender differences. The section relies on quantitative information from both the nationally 
representative 2005 MECOVI household survey and the 2007 micro and small enterprise 
survey carried out by Encuestas & Estudios, as well as on qualitative information from a 
review of the national and international literature, from stakeholder consultations, and from 
focus group meetings carried out in Bolivia during the first semester of 2007. 
 
Section 4 analyzes gender differences in the profitability of micro and small enterprises 
using the 2007 micro and small enterprise survey. The results indicate that once controlling 
for business size (as measured by productive capital and number of employees) and sector 
of work, there are no significant difference in the profitability of male and female run 
businesses. It is therefore particularly important to understand which constraints women 
face in expanding their businesses. 
 
Section 5 provides an in depth analysis of productivity constraints for small businessmen 
and women in four different sectors, using the 2007 micro and small enterprise survey as 
well as qualitative inputs from focus group meetings in El Alto, La Paz, Cochabamba and 
Santa Cruz. 
 
Finally, section 6 summarizes the main conclusions and presents a list of policy 
recommendations arising from the quantitative and qualitative analysis carried out. 
 
  
2. The context 
 
The urban labor market in Bolivia can be divided into 4 main sectors:  
 
1) the public sector,   7
2) the formal private sector,  
3) self-employed informals, and  
4) informal workers.  
 
Although there is quite a lot of variance within each sector, it is clear that the public sector 
attracts the most educated people and provides the best benefits. The formal private sector 
is competing with the public sector for skilled employees, but generally can not provide 
quite as generous benefits, so this sector ends up with somewhat less educated people.
10  
 
At the other end of the specter, and quite separate from the two formal sectors, we find self-
employed informals and informal workers. People in these two sectors have much lower 
levels of education and receive much lower incomes. Figure 1 shows average incomes and 
average education levels for the four sectors, by gender and ethnicity. This results in 16 
different groups, whose relative importance is reflected by the size of each bubble.  
 
Public sector jobs are almost evenly split between men and women and between indigenous 
and non-indigenous people. Indigenous women in this sector on average earn less than the 
others, but that is likely explained by the large number of PLANE workers (emergency 
employment program that hire workers for three weeks on a lottery basis and pays very low 
salaries) that are registered as public sector employees. 
 
The formal private sector is dominated by non-indigenous men, while women and 
indigenous men are underrepresented. The formal private sector is currently particularly 
unattractive for women due to a significant gender-based wage gap which is much less 
pronounced in the public sector and which does not exist in the informal sector (once 
controlling for education and other inputs – see subsequent sections). This wage gap is 
most likely explained by the large costs that pregnancies impose on formal firms, as these 
are required to pay three months of maternity leave, in addition to suffering interruptions in 
the work flow and incurring extra training costs. 
 
While informal self-employed and informal workers have approximately the same levels of 
education, the self-employed earn systematically higher incomes. The advantage of being 
self-employed is particularly large for women. For example, the average indigenous female 
informal worker earns a wage of only Bs. 2.71/hour whereas the average indigenous self-
employed female makes Bs. 4.23, despite the fact that the latter has 1.3 years less 
education. For non-indigenous females the difference is even larger, with the informal 
employee earning an average of Bs. 3.58/hour and the self-employed earning Bs. 7.08/hour, 
for identical education levels.  
 
The fact that women are punished in the private formal sector (both in terms of wages and 
access) and earns much more as informally self-employed than as informal worker helps 
explain why women are over-represented in the group of self-employed informals (as 
shown in Table 1). For women who do not have the necessary education to work in the 
                                                 
10 Advantages of working in the public sector include higher salaries, more stable jobs, health insurance, 
rights to paid maternity leave, shorter working hours, and in some cases power and access to additional 
income from bribes (Andersen & Christensen 2006).  8
public sector (typically as teachers, nurses, and secretaries), being informally self-employed 
appears to be the most attractive alternative. 
 
Figure 1: Education and wages in urban Bolivia, by sector, gender and ethnicity, 2005 
Informal Worker






















































































Source: Authors’ estimation based on MECOVI 2005. Note: Self-employed and unpaid family members 
within each family are assumed to share the incomes from their micro-business, according to the hours 
worked, rather than all income being attributed to one of the family members (the head), as is often done. 
 
Another way to illustrate gender differences in the urban labor market is to classify the 
working population by activity. Figure 2 shows that women are concentrated in commerce 
and domestic service, whereas men are concentrated in manufacturing, construction and 
transport. Again it is clear that gender wage gaps are much larger for high levels of 
education, whereas there is no discernible gender wage gap for low levels of education. For 
example, in the health sector, both men and women on average have a bit more than 15 
years of education, but women earn only half as much as men. In contrast, men and women 
in the hotel and restaurant sector earn the same level of incomes despite the fact that 
women have 2.3 years less education, on average. 
 
For men there is a clear positive relationship between education and earnings. The 
occupations which require high levels of education also pay correspondingly high salaries. 
This relationship is much less clear in the case of women. For example, women working in 
health and formal services with around 15 years of education earn pretty much the same as 
women working in urban agriculture with half the level of education. This implies that the 
returns to education are smaller for women than for men.  9
 
Policies to promote gender equality in the labor market therefore principally have to tackle 
the problems in the formal sector, so that this sector can become more attractive for 
women. Policies designed to educate and formalize women in the informal sector will not 
be successful unless the formal sector becomes an attractive alternative for these women. 
 
At the moment, becoming a teacher is an attractive option for women, as this occupation 
yields a decent return to education, and in addition requires relatively few hours of work, 
comes with life-time employment guarantee, and provides full benefits. But there is a limit 
to how many teachers the country can employ. 
  


























































Source: Authors’ estimation based on MECOVI 2005. Note: Self-employed and unpaid family members 
within each family are assumed to share the incomes from their micro-business, according to the hours 
worked, rather than all income being attributed to one of the family members (the head), as is often done. 
 
Conceptually, there are two different ways to increase the incomes of the population groups 
in the lower end of the income distribution. Either the average incomes of these groups can 
be increased, or the individuals can move to groups with higher average incomes.  
 
The first option requires understanding and alleviating productivity constraints within each 
group. Constraints could be related to lack of customers/clients, lack of training, lack of 
credit, unreliable supply of inputs, unreliable workers, excessive bureaucracy, unfair  10
competition, simultaneous family obligations, etc. The 2007 survey of micro and small 
enterprises is specifically designed to identify the most binding constraints, and to test 
whether constraints differ between men and women. These issues will be analyzed in 
section 5 below. 
 
The second option involves facilitating the move of individuals from one group to another. 
In the short to medium run it is difficult to move people from the informal to the formal 
sector, due to restrictions in formal education. But there are many other options. For 
example, the move from informal worker to informal self-employed appears particularly 
attractive as the switch does not seem to demand additional formal education. Indeed, the 
average education level of informal self-employed women is slightly lower than that of 
female informal employees, whereas average wages are 71% higher.  
 
A change of sector is another possible change. Urban agriculture appears to be a 
particularly attractive option for women with low levels of education. In contrast to rural 
agriculture, urban agriculture is concentrated in activities with high value added, such as 
fruits, flowers, alfa alfa, chicken, pigs, etc. 
 
A change of location is also an option. Informal women do substantially better in Santa 
Cruz de la Sierra than any other place in the country. Indeed they do better than both men 
and women in the formal sector in El Alto, and better than most informal men (see Figure 
3). 
 

























































Source: Authors’ estimation based on MECOVI 2005. Note: Self-employed and unpaid family members 
within each family are assumed to share the incomes from their micro-business, according to the hours 
worked, rather than all income being attributed to one of the family members (the head), as is often done. 
 
It is important to ensure that there is room for new entrants in the destination groups, 
however. The transport sector, for example, is currently so saturated that fares are being 
discounted far below the official tariffs, with obvious implications for the incomes of the 
drivers. Seventeen percent of incumbents in the transport sector plan to abandon this 
activity in the near future, which is more than in any other of the informal sectors. Among 
hotel and restaurant owners, only seven percent wishes to abandon their business, despite 
the fact that incomes are low in this sector
11. 
 
In this paper we will identify both the constraints to improving productivity within each 
group, and the constraints to moving from a low productivity group to one with higher 
average productivity. The first type of constraints will be called productivity constraints, 
and the second type will be called mobility constraints. It should be kept in mind, though, 
that mobility constraints are not only limited to physical mobility, but also includes other 
types of changes (such as change of sector or change in legal status). 
 
 
3. Productivity and mobility constraints 
 
This section analyses possible productivity and mobility constraints, focusing particularly 
on gender differences in these constraints. The analysis uses several different 
complementary sources: 1) a review of the local and international literature, 2) qualitative 
information from focus group interviews with micro and small business owners in La Paz, 
El Alto, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz, 3) quantitative information from the nationally 
representative 2005 MECOVI household survey, and 4) quantitative information from a 
2007 survey of micro and small enterprises carried out by Encuestas & Estudios 
specifically for the study of informality and productivity.  
 
 
A. Productivity constraints by gender 
 
Lack of capital 
 
For labor to be productive, complementary inputs are absolutely essential. Some sectors are 
more capital intensive than others, but even the least capital intensive activity requires some 
initial investment. For example, to sell sweaters you would at the very least need a llama to 
cut wool from and a couple of knitting sticks. But you would be much more productive if 
you could buy the wool already spun and dyed, had one or more knitting machines to help 
you, and a distribution system for getting the sweaters to the buyers. 
 
One of the main reasons for low labor productivity, and thus low incomes, is a lack of 
capital to invest in complementary inputs. And in this aspect women have a substantial 
                                                 
11 According to information in the MECOVI 2005.  12
disadvantage compared to men. As we will see later, female micro entrepreneurs in Bolivia 
have only a third of the productive assets than male entrepreneurs, and this is the main 
reason why they have lower earnings (see Section 4 below). 
 
There are several reasons why women have fewer opportunities to accumulate capital than 
men. First of all, they spend a lot of time on non-remunerated activities related to 
reproduction and home-making (e.g. Bianchi 2000; Cunningham 2001; Winkler 2002). The 
more children they have, the less time they will have to earn money and accumulate capital. 
Even if men share their incomes completely with their wives, families with many children 
will typically not be able to earn as much income per capita as families with few children 
(Andersen 2007).  
 
Second, even if women could work as much as men, they tend to earn significantly less per 
hour worked. Some of the difference in salaries is due to differences in education and 
experience, but even controlling for that, women tend to earn 20-30% less than men in 
Bolivia (Andersen & Muriel 2002). 
 
Third, there is a tendency for women to spend more of their incomes on the education of 
their children (e.g. Handa 1994; Andersen, Christensen & Molina 2005), implying that less 
is left over for savings and investment in a business. 
 
One counter-acting factor would be that women, at least in the past, tended to study much 
less than men, so they had more years to work. 
 
  
Lack of access to credit 
 
The lack of savings could potentially be alleviated by access to credit, but women in 
general make much less use of formal credit than men. The 2007 survey of micro- and 
small enterprises in Bolivia, for example, show that only 19% of female run businesses 
have made any use of bank loans, while this is the case for 29% of male run businesses. 
Even in the case of micro-credit, which often is specifically targeted at women, female 
entrepreneurs have made less use of it than men (5.9% versus 7.1%). 
 
Experiences in the region with facilitating access to credit for women show that low female 
participation rates do not reflect a lack of demand or that women are disinclined to borrow. 
For instance, in Costa Rica, women’s share among borrowers in the National Bank 
increased by 240% in the five-year period of 1999 to 2003, following initiatives to 
consolidate and adapt a credit system specifically for women (Zúñiga 2004).  
 
Access to credit is particularly hindered by gender inequalities in the distribution of 
property rights and other practical obstacles such as lacking identification, and in the case 
of indigenous women, language and cultural barriers. In a set of Latin American countries, 
Deere & Leon (2003) found that roughly 70–90 percent of formal owners of farmland are 
men, and when women do own farmland, their holdings are typically smaller than men’s
12. 
                                                 
12 The sample includes Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, and Peru.  13
Without formal property rights, women are excluded from the direct economic benefits of 
land; these include income from production, rental or sale as well as the use of land as 
collateral for credit. In cases where women's property rights are tenuous and/or hinge on 
their status as wives, mothers, and daughters, women's capacity to gain from the expansion 
of high value agricultural exports may also be limited (Dolan & Sorby 2003). The land 
titling practices in Bolivia are currently changing so that there are many more joint titles 
(58%), whereas titles exclusively for women are still rare (6%) compared to titles being 
awarded to men alone (24%)
13. 
 
Focus group interviews with female micro-entrepreneurs in Bolivia reveal that it is not 
difficult to obtain loans in Bolivia – indeed there are many microfinance institutions 
actively pushing credit on this group – but that the interest rates are much too high, the 
borrowing period too short, and the requirements concerning group guarantees and 
attendance at bi-weekly workshops very inconvenient. Many are scared of loosing their 
assets if one month they cannot make their payments, and women who have not had to take 
a micro-finance loan consider themselves lucky
14. A source inside Pro-Mujer (an NGO 
lending exclusively to women in Bolivia) admits that they prefer to work with women in El 
Alto as they are less educated, less aware of the laws, and thus easier to scare into paying
15. 
 
Formal bank loans are more attractive, but the requirements almost impossible to comply 
with for micro-entrepreneurs. Typically the bank demands monthly income statements, 
which own-account workers don’t have, as well as real estate documents, which are often 
missing or incomplete even when people do own both land and buildings. In addition, the 
banks are rarely willing to give loans to single women, as these are considered more risky 




Lack of human capital and social capital 
 
There are important gender-based differences in human capital (education, training, 
experience) that could operate as potential constraint to the productivity of female 
entrepreneurs and self-employed. Nowhere are the gender and ethnicity gaps in education 
larger than among the informally self-employed (see Table 2). In this sector the average 
non-indigenous man has 9.9 years of education while the average indigenous woman only 
has 6.3 years of education. In contrast, in the private formal sector, the difference is 
substantially smaller (12.1 years for non-indigenous men versus 11.0 years for indigenous 





                                                 
13 Bolivia (2005). 
14 Focus group meetings with female micro-entrepreneurs in El Alto, La Paz, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz 
carried out by Encuestas & Estudios during June 2007. 
15 Gibb (2007).  
16 Focus group meetings with female micro-entrepreneurs in El Alto, La Paz, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz 
carried out by Encuestas & Estudios during June 2007.  14
Table 2: Education levels, by sector, gender, and ethnicity (years of schooling) 











Informal worker  8.8 8.7 8.4 7.0 
Informal self-employed  9.9 8.5 8.4 6.3 
Formal Private  12.1 10.8 12.9 11.0 
Public 15.2 14.2 14.6 12.6 
Note: Formality is defined as having a tax-payer identification number (NIT). 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the 2005 MECOVI. Urban areas only. 
 
Some researchers note that the usefulness to poor micro-entrepreneurs, even of 
participatory skills and business training, cannot be assumed. With or without the required 
business and management skills, the multiple constraints faced by many poor women 
entrepreneurs, especially very small producers and market vendors, means they are often 
unable to act upon these. Moreover, several studies of male entrepreneurs have found that 
the skill level of small producers is often not a primary constraint. Furthermore, focusing on 
training could divert attention from external constraints, and result in putting the blame for 
failure on women themselves (Mayoux 1995).  
 
The results presented in Section 5 (Table 4) of the present report confirm that formal 
education is not a binding constraint among small entrepreneurs in Bolivia. Indeed the 
returns to an additional year of schooling are close to zero. The fact that formal schooling is 
un-important in this sector helps explain why indigenous women (the least educated group 
in Bolivia) find it particularly attractive. 
 
For poor women entrepreneurs, systems of networking and information exchange may 
often be more valuable interventions than skills and business training on their own. Such 
programs could act as a focus for mobilization to change the wider constraints as well as 
assisting women to devise methods which are appropriate to their needs (Mayoux 1995).  
 
As stated by Carr & Chen (2004), workers in the informal economy have until recently 
been considered as unorganized by definition. However, recent evidence suggests that the 
informal workforce has been and is being organized, both by formal trade unions, 
alternative trade unions and pro-labor NGOs. International alliances such as HomeNet and 
StreetNet are working to promote the visibility and voice of own-account workers (Brill, 
2002).  
 
With the exception of crafts, own account activities and micro-enterprises have tended to be 
linked to local and domestic markets. However, globalization is now opening up new 
opportunities for the self-employed to be directly involved in export markets if they have 
the ways and means to take advantage of these opportunities. Some of the self-employed 
have been able to link with global markets on their own terms through a range of strategies 
(including the formation of associations and cooperatives), often with the assistance of 
local and international NGOs, government departments and local social entrepreneurs (See 
Box 2 for a Bolivian example). 
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In Bolivia, 33% of all self-employed are members of some organization that is supposed to 
promote their interests. This is considerably more than the 19% of salaried employees who 
are members of some labor organization. However, female self-employed are less likely to 
be affiliated than male self-employed (23% for women versus 39% for men)
17.  
 
The difference between men and women is due to sectoral segregation, since within each 
sector there is no systematic difference between man and women. Men are concentrated in 
the transport sector, which is a highly organized sector with 63% belonging to some union. 
In this sector, the most important benefits from belonging to a union are a) the capacity to 
negotiate with the government and the various inspectors and b) the protection of their 
routes. In contrast, women are concentrated in the grocery store and food businesses, which 
have low levels of organization (8% and 17%, respectively) and most people see no 
benefits of belonging to a union, except sometimes to protect the physical space for food 
sales in the latter case
18. 
 
Unions and organizations are not particularly liked by the members, who frequently 
mention that the representatives are just trying to extract as much money as possible from 
the members without bringing any benefits. Indeed, distrust towards organizations and 
partnerships is almost universal among small micro-entrepreneurs. They generally feel that 
partners or associates cannot be trusted and that even in the best of cases there would be a 
lot of fighting about the distribution of work and profits. Focus group participants express a 
strong wish to expand, but they are not willing to form partnerships in order to create 
economies of scale. They express reluctance even to hire people, because as soon as the 
contracted worker has learned the trade, s/he is likely to quit and set up a competing 
business in the same area.
19 Such strong aversion against partnerships and the sharing of 
knowledge suggests an important lack of social capital in Bolivia. 
 
We have little empirical evidence to analyze whether there are gender differences in the 
lack of trust and social capital. The focus group interviews indicated that it was almost 
universal among the participating women, but quantitative information from the 2007 micro 
and small business survey suggests that it may be no better for men. For example, it would 
require at least some social capital and trust to be able to borrow the physical space for the 
business and 11% of women were able to do that while only 5% of men operated from 
borrowed premises. The percentage was particularly high for indigenous women (17%), 
suggesting that this group may have more social capital than men and non-indigenous 
women.   
 
Lack of markets 
 
Since most of the micro-entrepreneurs in Bolivia cater to the domestic market (less than 5% 
have any exports at all)
20, the limited size of this market can be a serious constraint to 
                                                 
17 According to information from the MECOVI 2005. 
18 According to the 2007 micro and small business survey. 
19 Focus group meetings with female micro-entrepreneurs in El Alto, La Paz, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz 
carried out by Encuestas & Estudios during June 2007. 
20 According to the 2007 micro and small business survey.  16
raising profitability. Especially the transport sector and the grocery store sector are so 
saturated that profits have been driven down close to the level of unskilled informal 
employees.  
 
However, as we will see in Section 5 below, exports under current conditions do not appear 
to be the solution for small entrepreneurs. In general it does not have a beneficial effect on 
business profitability (the coefficient on the export dummy in Table 4 is negative, but 
statistically insignificant), and exports also demand much larger and more risky 
investments. This would be particularly discouraging for women, who feel that they cannot 
gamble with their family’s basic sustenance and future.
21 One key person interviewed 
stated that in Bolivia it is not “Export or die!” but rather “Export and die!”
22.  
 
Micro-entrepreneurs would need substantially improved government support in order to be 
able to export. Focus group participants highlight the Peruvian government’s strategy for 
promoting the exports of products made from camelid wool, through industrialization, 
participation in international expositions, and improved design.
23  
 
Private sector initiatives can also facilitate exports from even very small and informal 
handicraft producers. BoliviaMall, for example, is a private enterprise which exploits 
information technology to sell Bolivian products through the Internet to customers all over 
the World (see Box 1). 
 
Box 1: Exporting handicrafts from Bolivia 
 
BoliviaMall.com is the leader in e-business in Bolivia exporting over 6000 Bolivian products 
from 750 small vendors and artisans to over 70 countries around the world. The company, which 
is 100% internet based, has grown 5000% over the last six years while generating an enormous, 
but unplanned, social impact. About 98% of the suppliers are informal. Most of the artisans are 
men, but often their wives manage the business, negotiate with the company, and handle the 
money. 
 
In March 2007, BoliviaMall participated in the forum entitled “United Nations meets Silicon 
Valley” organized by INTEL and the Global Alliance for ITC, as a showcase of how technology 
can help the poor. 
 
Source: BoliviaMall press-release, March 9, 2007, as well as personal communication with Executive 
Director, Percy Prieto on 19 June 2007. 
 
                                                 
21 Personal interview with Lourdes Montero, Executive Director of the Gregorio Apaza Foundation in El Alto 
on the 4
th of April 2007. She has 20 years of experience with female micro-entrepreneurs in El Alto, which 
should give some weight to her opinions. 
22 Personal interview with Lourdes Montero, Executive Director of the Gregorio Apaza Foundation in El Alto 
on the 4
th of April 2007.  
23 Encuestas & Estudios (2007). This in not only a perception by focus group participants. The National 
Strategy for Peruvian Alpaca was launched in 2005 by the Minister of Agriculture and the Minister of 
Production.  17
The local market for clothes suffers from the importing of used clothes to Bolivia, with 
which it is difficult to compete
24. This has prompted several protests from clothes 
manufacturers and the government has passed a couple of supreme decrees in order to 
regulate the importing of used clothes
25 (which was then met by protests from the tens of 
thousands who live from selling used clothes, however). A study by the Bolivian Institute 
of International Commerce (IBCE) sustains that the importation of used clothes costs 
Bolivia around 15.300 jobs annually, and 93% of imports are illegal, thus making no fiscal 
contributions either (Vidaurre 2005). 
 
In the food sales sector, the local market is a limiting factor in some particular areas, but 
not in others. In El Alto, it is cut-throat price competition, with customers demanding 
quantity rather than quality
26. But in other areas the same lunch plate can be sold at prices 
varying by a factor of 10 or more
27, suggesting much less fierce price competition. Indeed 
both men and women in the food sales business maintain higher average profits per hour 
worked than any of the other sectors studied in the 2007 micro and small business survey 





As argued above, the fact that women take on a disproportionate share of domestic chores 
implies that they have less time for remunerated work. This division of work within the 
family is to a large extent rational – it is the women who give birth and have to nurse the 
babies, and on top of that they tend to earn less in the labor market than men. Switching 
roles would imply a substantial loss in welfare for the typical family. However, the fact that 
more of domestic work falls on women – regardless of their own and their spouse’s 
employment status is a problem  not inly in pure equity terms, but it also has efficiency 
implications. For instance, regardless of whether incomes are shared fairly, women’s labor 
force participation and control over earnings affect the way households budgets are spent. 
Hoddinot & Haddad (1995), for example, find that an increase in the share of household 
income earned by women in Côte  d’Ivoire raises the proportion of the household budget 
expended on food and reduces the  budget shares of alcohol and cigarettes. Similarly, in 
Ghana, an increase in the share of  women’s assets raises household spending on  food and 
children’s schooling (Doss 1996). 
 
Additional problems can arise if families break down and women are left with many 
responsibilities but few resources and little labor market experience. In Bolivia, 17.2% of 
all families contain a single parent, most of them (84%) single mothers. Some single 
parents deal with the difficulties by moving in with other family members, which reduce 
their vulnerability. For example, single mothers living alone with their children are 26% 
more likely to be poor than single mothers living in an extended family. Single fathers are 
                                                 
24 Focus group meeting carried out by Encuestas & Estudios during February 2007. 
25 Decreto Supremo No. 27340 of 31-01-2004, which was extended by Decreto Supremo No. 28614 of 01-02-
2006.  
26 Focus group meeting carried out by Encuestas & Estudios during February 2007. 
27 Accroding to the 2007 micro and small business survey.  18
uncommon, but they do quite well whether they live alone with their children or in an 
extended family.
 28  
 
Clearly the most vulnerable of single parents are single mothers living alone with their 
children. Among this group 60.4% of households are poor, compared to only 44.5% of 
single fathers living alone with their kids, and compared to only 48.0% of single mothers 
living in an extended family. However, this should be compared to the 62.5% poverty level 
in classic nuclear households with a mother, a father, and one or more children, which is 
the most common type of households in Bolivia
29. Thus, single mothers living alone with 
their children are doing marginally better than mothers living with a partner, and single 
mothers living in an extended household do substantially better
30.  
 
The important difference is not the number or sex of the parents but rather the number of 
children in the family. While urban households with no children have an average poverty 
rate of 25%, this increases to 44% for households with 1-3 children, although there is no 
difference in education levels between the two groups. In rural areas the impact of children 
is more moderate with a 6 percentage point difference in poverty rates between households 
with no children and households with 1-3 children
31. This suggests that urban households 
have more difficulties coping with the presence of children than rural households, possibly 
because in urban areas the presence of children puts serious constraints on women’s labor 
market options.  
 
One option for alleviating such constraints would be to introduce free public childcare. This 
has proved to be a successful strategy in other Latin American countries, such as Peru, 
Colombia and Guatemala (Hallman et al 2003). Childcare alternatives and choices affect 
not only whether women work, but also the type of work they engage in and the amount of 
time they spend in paid work. As such, providing child care for the poor is one way making 
occupational segregation by gender more a question of preference than a result of juggling 
productive and reproductive roles (see Box 2).    
 
Box 2: Childcare in Guatemala City 
In poor urban neighborhoods of Guatemala City, affordable childcare is scarce and in 
high demand, especially since many poor mothers are migrants that live away from 
extended family and have less access to informal alternative caregiver. In response, the 
government-sponsored day-care program Hogares Comunitarios (HC) was developed to 
offer poor families a package of services to promote child nutrition, socialization, and 
development, under the condition that parents engage in income-generating activities 
outside the home. Launched in Guatemala city in the early 1990s, it HC has since 
expanded to all 22 departments of the country. 
                                                 
28 According to information from the MECOVI 2005. 
29 According to information from the MECOVI 2005. 
30 This finding is confirmed by other measures of well-being, such as per capita household income, which is 
Bs. 552/month/person for single mother households but only Bs. 431/month/person for classic nuclear 
households. 
31 According to information from the MECOVI 2005.  19
HC is a community-based childcare program. A group of parents select a caretaker from 
the community to care for up to ten children, seven years old or younger, in her home, 
weekdays from 6am to 6pm. The caretaker receives a cash transfer to purchase food for 
the children, to purchase gas and educational supplies, and as compensation. Parents 
complement this with a small monthly contribution and provide monthly supplies of basic 
items (e.g. toothpaste, toilet paper etc.). The caretaker is also given furniture, equipment, 
educational materials, and supplies; initial training; and guidance on food preparation.  
An evaluation of the program in one neighborhood of Guatemala City suggest that it 
contributed to poverty alleviation by reducing childcare constraints and facilitating poor 
parents’ access to formal sector jobs. This was especially true for women who are sole 
income earner for their households. In general, the program benefit two groups of women 
  Mothers of participating children, mostly young poorly-educated working mothers, 
many single were more likely to be engaged in formal stable employment after 
program participation. They also realized higher wages and a larger number of 
employment benefits than working mothers who use alternative childcare 
arrangements 
  Care takers, generally older, less educated women with more limited possibilities to 
work outside the home, benefited through the generation of some (albeit low) income 
The program was also found to significantly improve the diet and nutrition of 
participating children who consumed on average 20 percent more energy, protein, and 
iron, and 50 percent more vitamin A than non-participants.  
While HC is one of the cheapest childcare programs available in the neighborhood, the 
evaluation found that only 3 percent of eligible households participated. A significant 
proportion of non-users preferred alternative caregivers such as extended family, 
however, nearly half of the working mothers expressed interest in the program but were 
precluded from participating due to lack of available space. 
 




Good versus bad self-employment 
 
Recent research has made the distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ self-employment. Good 
self-employment refers to entrepreneurs who hire and pay others to work for them, and 
‘bad’ self-employment includes those who work for their own account or only employ 
unpaid family workers. According to Morrison (2007), women are typically concentrated in 
bad self-employment.  
 
While this distinction between ‘good’ businesses (professionally run, with people hired 
according to qualifications) and ‘bad’ businesses (family businesses employing whoever is 
available for free) does make some sense, the 2007 micro and small enterprise survey does 
not support the conclusion regarding gender. Among the firms surveyed, the share of  20
unpaid family workers in female managed enterprises was only 14% compared to 18% 
among male managed enterprises. 
 
The assumption that family members are working for free is also dubious. It may be that 
they are not paid a regular salary, but they will get a share of the earnings through the 
general increase in household consumption that the family business allows for. When faced 
with the choice of using unpaid family members or paid employees, the owners of micro-
businesses often prefer family members because that implies that the earnings stay in the 
family instead of systematically escaping in the form of salaries to non-household 
members. Indeed, many micro-businesses are so precarious that the commitment to pay a 
regular salary appears impossible.
32 
 
In this paper, we have re-estimated all labor income variables taking into account that 
family members are not really working for free. In each family, whenever there is a self-
employed person and one or more un-paid family members, the incomes are shared evenly 
between them according to the number of hours worked. This is much more reasonable 
than assuming that one family member gets all the income and the rest nothing.  
 
 
B. Mobility constraints by gender 
 
a. Lack of capital and know-how to start up own business 
 
One desirable move seems to be from informal worker to informal self-employed, but it 
requires both capital and know-how to start up a new business. Self-employed people, and 
especially self-employed women, are generally older than informal employees or formal 
sector employees, which suggests that setting up an own business is something that is 
usually done later in life, after some accumulation of human and physical capital has taken 
place. Evans & Jovanovic (1989) argue that the observed increasing probability of self-
employment with age is consistent with the existence of credit constraints. Balán, 
Browning & Jelin (1973) also supports this view, arguing that young workers enter salaried 
work in order to accumulate knowledge, capital, and contacts, and then they quit to open 
their own informal businesses. 
 
If this is the case, women may have particularly large obstacles to making a successful 
transition into self-employment, both because they tend to earn less during employment 
(e.g. Andersen & Muriel 2002) and because property, land ownership, productive capital 
and equity in general are not evenly distributed between men and women (Valenzuela 
2005). For example, although recent reforms in land titling in Bolivia imply that most titles 
(58%) are now being awarded jointly to couples, four times as many titles are being 
awarded to men alone than to women alone (24% versus 6%) (Bolivia 2005). 
 
On the other hand, given that becoming self-employed is always a risky proposition (Balán, 
Browning & Jelin 1973), women have less to loose than men by switching to self-
                                                 
32 According to focus group interviews among women in the most precarious end of the textiles, food and 
camelid sectors.  21
employment, since their jobs as employees tend to be less secure and pay less, or the 
alternative may be not to be economically active at all. 
 
 
b. Occupational segregation due to perceived gender roles 
 
Perhaps the most striking example of occupational segregation can be seen in Figure 2 
above, in the case of men and women in the health sector. Although both men and women 
in this sector have average education levels of approximately 15 years, men earn more than 
twice as much as women. This is mainly due to the fact that most women have chosen to 
become public sector nurses whereas most men are private sector doctors.  
 
Such self-segregation of women into occupations that tend to pay less is widespread in 
Bolivia, and is one of the principal explanations why women generally earn less than men 
(Muriel 2005). And this is true throughout Latin America: In fact, LAC is the region with 
the highest level of occupational segregation by gender  in the world (Deutsch et al. 2005). 
The authors also find that occupational segregation is more severe for the poorly educated. 
 
In many cases this segregation is based on gender stereotypes, with no strong logic behind. 
There is no clear reason why women should not be doctors, especially since a large part of 
the health system is geared towards pregnant women, child-birth and the care of young 
children, and these clients might actually prefer to have a female rather than a male doctor. 
 
Whenever occupational segregation is based on gender stereotypes only, this can be 
changed. The experience of PLANE (a Bolivian employment program offering three-week 
public construction jobs on a lottery basis, and which at its peak employed 75.000 persons) 
clearly shows this (RED, 2004). Although this program was not initially targeted at women 
it now overwhelmingly (85%) employs women. The jobs require no qualifications, but 
inevitably teach the workers some useful skills during those 3 weeks. In many cases, it is 
the first time that these women have a formal job with a salary, and as a valuable side-effect 
they learn from each other how to organize day-care for their children and solve other 
common problems of working women. After having worked one or two times in PLANE, 
they also qualify for small municipal construction or maintenance projects. Ex-PLANE 
workers have even organized themselves into a national union with significant political 
clout (Sierra & Calle 2006). 
 
In other cases there is a clear logic behind women’s occupational choices (Arias et al 
2005). For example, women’s preference for informal commerce may be partly explained 
by the flexibility it offers. A young child can be simultaneously cared for and a relative can 
take over the post for shorter or longer periods if need be – a situation that would be 
unthinkable for most formal employees. Also, the business can start out modestly and 






c. Lack of physical mobility 
 
Bolivia is experiencing massive migration from the highlands to the lowlands, which is 
consistent with the better economic opportunities in Santa Cruz (see Figure 3 above). Still, 
mobility is far from perfect. The differences in terms of culture, languages, climate and 
living costs between El Alto and Santa Cruz de la Sierra are as large, or bigger, than those 
between Santa Cruz and Miami. Highlanders are uncomfortable in the hot and humid 
climate of Santa Cruz, and, with good reason, they fear the tropical diseases that can be 
contracted in the lowlands (mainly malaria and dengue). There are also important cultural 
differences which divide the country and reduce the free flow of people.
33  
 
It is not clear whether physical mobility differs by gender, but women may have a small 
advantage due to the fact that they are typically disfavored when it comes to inheriting land. 
This is particularly evident in rural-urban migration, as women are over-represented in 
urban areas. However, they are not as over-represented in Santa Cruz de la Sierra as in the 
other Bolivian cities, expect for Oruro
34, so there may be some particular constraint to 
women moving to Santa Cruz.  
 
Jiménez (2003) shows that, contrary to expectations, female rural-urban migrants in her 
sample had more human capital than their male counterparts (higher education levels, more 
likely to be bi-lingual), and their migration was more likely to be permanent rather than 
temporary (46% for women versus 32% for men). The fact that women are more likely to 
make a permanent move and that they are more likely to speak Castellano, improves their 
chances for successful integration in the urban labor market, whereas the temporary 
migration more typical of men makes it difficult for them to accumulate the information, 
connections, and human capital necessary to access better paid jobs.  
 
 
d. Constraints to becoming formal 
 
The constraints to becoming formal are found principally in the formal sector itself, and 
have to do with all the red tape and high level of taxes that are associated with being formal 
in Bolivia; as one informant put it: “In Bolivia there are informals and there are idiots.”
35  
 
Currently, few firms benefit from becoming formal, and the benefit is usually in the form of 
access to formal sector clients (mainly the public sector and public sector employees), who 
demand facturas in order to avoid taxes (RC-IVA) being deducted from their pay checks. 
Formality is not a requirement for access to finance, and not even for exporting, as a large 
part, if not the main part, of both exports and imports are informal (contrabando). In the 
2007 micro and small business survey, 59% of exporting firms were informal in the sense 
that they did not have a tax identification number (NIT). 
                                                 
33 Nación Camba, a movement for the indepence of the lowland areas highlight the cultural differences 
between highland Bolivia and lowland Bolivia (http://www.nacioncamba.net/quienesomos.htm).  
34 According to information from the MECOVI 2005. 
35 Phrase cited by Luis Alberto Quiroga, who owns the formal enterprise Entcuestas & Estudios and has 
interviewed thousands of both formal and informal entrepreneurs (personal interview on the 8th of June, 
2007).  23
 
Since informality is the norm rather than the exception in Bolivia, the government does 
little to punish firms for being informal. In the food sales and the transport sector, where 
there are legitimate health concerns justifying public inspection, only 4% and 9% of firms 
had paid any fines for incompliance with required certification during 2006
36. 
 
Except for the high end of some sectors (fancy cafés, luxurious shawls and elaborately 
carved furniture, for example) firms usually compete on price and feel that the 15% 
increase in price that would follow from being formal and issuing facturas would drive 
their customers away. However, micro firms express a willingness to become formal and 
issue facturas if they grow to have several employees and if their customers demand it
37. 
 
The World Bank (2007) formally models the decision to become formal and finds that size 
of business (as measured by number of employees and size of capital) is one of the most 
important determinants on the probability of having a NIT. In addition, tax numbers are 
more common for older, more able entrepreneurs, who went into self-employment for the 
prospect of business growth, face high tax inspection rates in their city and industry, and 
live close to the SIN office where registration takes place. Tax numbers are less common 
for individuals going into self-employment in order to be able to also care for children or 
parents and for firms in El Alto and La Paz compared with firms in Santa Cruz and 
Cochabamba. The decision to become formal does not significantly vary by gender, marital 
status, language as a child, poverty level as a child, or education level, conditional on these 
other characteristics.  
 
Women have a lower level of formality than men when we don’t control for differences in 
characteristics: 22 percent of women have a tax number and 46 percent a municipal license, 
compared with 33 percent of men who have a tax number and 60 percent who have a 
municipal license. However, these differences can be explained by differences in the size of 
the business, the motivations for going into self-employment (women are more likely to 
value the ability to care for family), differences in self-efficacy (the women in the survey 
have lower entrepreneurial efficacy than men), and differences in the industries in which 
men and women are more concentrated. Likewise, while more educated individuals are 
more likely to be formal, the ability of the owner and reasons for being in business matter 
more than education alone for determining the choice to become formal (World Bank, 
2007). 
 
Firms with a NIT generally are more profitable than firms without a NIT, but this does not 
imply that obtaining a tax identification number (or complying with the other steps of 
becoming fully formal) causes profitability to increase. Considering the additional 
bureaucratic requirement and taxes levied on the firms, one would rather expect that 
formality causes a reduction in profitability. On the other hand, formality may change the 
customer base from very price conscientious informal customers, to more well-off 
customers who demand facturas, thus allowing an increase in profits. Formality may also 
                                                 
36 According to information from the 2007 micro and small business survey. 
37 Focus group interviews carried out by Encuestas & Estudios during February and June of 2007.  24
help gain access to credit on better terms (banks instead of microcredit institutions, for 
example).  
 
Disentangling the real profitability impact of becoming formal from the effect that only the 
most profitable firms grow enough to justify becoming formal is difficult. The World Bank 
(2007) uses several different estimation methods in an attempt to do so, and the main 
conclusion is that the benefits depend on firms’ size. For most micro firms (less than 3 
employees and Bs. 8,000 in productive capital), the effect would be negative, as the firms 
are too small to get any benefits from formality, and are stuck only with the costs. For 
slightly larger firms (2-5 workers and Bs. 8,000-34,000 in capital stock) the study finds a 
positive effect, implying that the benefits from increased access to better-off customers and 
bank credit outweighs the costs of being formal. For the largest firms in the sample (6 or 
more workers, productive capital of more than Bs. 34,000), the benefits of formality turns 
negative again, suggesting that if these firms have managed to grow without being formal, 
the usual benefits of being formal have not been a constraint, ant the switch to formality 
will impose only costs and provide no benefits (See Box 3).  25
 
Box 3: Getting an NIT pays off for small firms, but not for the micro or medium-sized firms in our 
sample. 
Figure 4 shows that having a NIT increases profits for firms with 2 to 5 workers and capital stock of 8000-
34000 Bolivianos, but decreases profits for firms who become formal at smaller sizes and for informal 
firms who become formal at larger sizes. 
Figure 4. Average impact of having a tax number on profitability, by firm size 











































Note: Bars show point estimates from Propensity Score Matching. Lines show 95 percent confidence 
intervals. 
 
What explains the nonlinear relationship seen in Figure 3.4? Firms of different sizes face different costs and 
benefits of becoming formal: 
•  The smallest firms don’t immediately benefit from becoming formal. Formalizing immediately 
involves more costs, but these firms are too small to benefit from increased customer base or better 
access to credit. However, if these firms plan on growing over time, this current cost of 
formalizing can be justified in terms of the benefits awaiting them as they become slightly bigger. 
For this reason, we find that firm owners who formalize when small tend to have higher 
entrepreneurial ability and more plans for business growth. 
•  Firms who wait and formalize when they are in the middle size group (2 to 5 workers and 8000-
34000 Bolivianos) are now big enough to enjoy some immediate benefits from formalizing. 
Section 6 shows the main benefit of getting a NIT appears to be the ability of a firm to expand its 
customer base by issuing tax receipts. 
•  Firms in our sample which have managed to get to a larger size - 6 or more workers and above 
34000 Bolivianos in capital stock - face a fall in profits from formalizing. These larger informal 
firms tend to have owners with less formal education, but higher entrepreneurial ability than firms 
of the same size with a NIT. Only 28 percent of them report receiving a visit from a tax inspector 
in the last year, compared to 81 percent of formal firms their size. Although we find these larger 
informal firms are less likely to get trade credit than formal firms of their size, we find that they 
are just as likely to have received loans, and are more likely to have received working capital, 
from banks or other financial institutions, as formal firms their size. Thus for a firm which has 
managed to reach this size while staying informal, the main impact of getting an NIT is just higher 
taxes. 
 
Source: The World Bank (2007)  26
 
The World Bank (2007) also tests for gender differences in the impact of becoming formal, 
and finds no difference between male and female owned businesses, once controlling for 
other characteristics. Thus, the main reason why female owned firms are more informal and 
less profitable than male owned businesses is not gender differences per se, but rather that:  
 
1)  Female run businesses are smaller, either by choice, due to lack of capital, or due 
to lack of markets in the sectors where they operate. 
 
2)  Women enter the business for different reasons - not so much to grow a business, 
but more to gain some economic independence and supplement family incomes 
while still having sufficient time and flexibility to simultaneously take care of 
family obligations. 
 
3)  Women choose different sectors than men. Women are more likely to be involved 
in food sales, camelid products, and groceries, and less likely to be in transport 
and wood. Female businesses are twice as likely to be operated out of the home as 
male businesses, which is associated with a lower likelihood of visits from tax 
inspectors. However, the greater tendency to work out of home is a function of the 
industry they work in – controlling for industry of work, females and males are 
equally likely to work at home. 
 
4)  Women have less education and possibly less entrepreneurial ability. Indicators of 
ability and self-confidence in the 2007 micro and small business survey suggest 




4. Explaining gender differences in profitability 
 
This section uses the 2007 micro and small enterprise survey carried out by the firm 
Encuestas & Estudios to analyze gender differences in the productivity of micro and small 
businesses (less than 25 employees). We only use firms that are fully owned by the owner-
manager’s family. There are about 446 firms for which we have adequate information to 
carry out a regression analysis. Half of these are managed by women. The firms are 
classified into 6 different sectors: 1) clothes manufacturing, 2) transportation, 3) grocery 
stores, 4) food sales, 5) wood products, 6) and products made from alpaca or other 
camelids. Except for 23 firms in the camelid product sector, all firms are located in urban 
areas (La Paz, El Alto, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz). Table 3 presents the most important 
summary statistics. 
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Table 3: Summary statistics for micro and small enterprises in the 2007 micro and small 
enterprise survey, by sector and gender 















Men    32 78 13 19 74  6 225  Number of 
observations  Women 42  3  54  63  9  44  221 
Men   2,063 1,228  931  2,236 1,858 1,174 1,605  Monthly 
profit (Bs.)  Women 755  1,833 1,065 1,181 1,366  651  962 
Men    66 63 86 60 57 42 62  Hours per 
week  Women  47 79 84 54 54 44 58 
Men    10.3 6.4  2.5 13.8 9.2 10.8 8.3  Hourly wage 
(Bs.)  Women  7.5 7.0 5.2 8.6 5.2 4.1 6.5 
Men    46,642 113,702 13,099  16,715  48,114  24,194  64,690  Assets 
1 
(Bs.)  Women 7,267  258,800  47,050 7,661 30,277 5,810 20,969 
Men    11.7 11.2 13.1 12.7 10.6 15.2 11.3  Education 
(years)  Women  9.5 15.0  11.3 8.5 12.1 5.9  9.1 
Men    5.4 1.2 3.5 4.9 4.6 6.2 3.5  Number of 
employees  Women  2.0 6.7 2.8 2.6 6.2 2.3 2.7 
Men    28 41 23 16 22 33 29  Bank loan 
(%)  Women  19 33 17 24 44 14 19 
Men   3.1  3.8  0.0  10.5  13.5  0.0  7.1  Micro credit 
(%)  Women  4.8 0.0 0.0 7.9  11.1  6.8 5.9 
Men    5.0 4.8 7.1 4.5 4.1  24.1  5.6  Additional 
empl. wanted  Women  10.6  19.2  -0.1 2.2 7.8 5.7 4.3 
Source: The 2007 micro and small enterprise survey.  
Notes: Sample includes only businesses with less than 25 employees, entirely owned by the respondent and his/her family. 
 1. Assets exclude the value of real estate. 
 
 
According to the data in the survey, the monthly profits of female micro-entrepreneurs are 
only about 60% the level of male micro-entrepreneurs. Some of the difference is due to the 
shorter working hours of women, but even after controlling for that, women earn 38% less 
than men. 
 
Table 3 shows that female run businesses operate with only a third of the productive capital 
compared to male run businesses, and about 23% fewer employees. This means that each 
employee has substantially less operating capital to work with, which would be expected to 
affect labor productivity. The much lower level of capital of women could be due to 
financing constraints, and indeed women are less likely to make use of both bank loans and 
micro credit. Contrary to the perception one might get from reading about the very 
successful microfinance industry in Bolivia, micro finance have been used by less than 6% 
of the business women in our sample. This is in contrast to bank loans which have been 
used by 19% of all female run businesses.  
 
Table 4 gradually decomposes the gender gap in hourly earnings in order to understand the 
underlying causes behind this gap. Column 1 shows the raw gap between men and 
women’s hourly wages. The coefficient of -0.481 on the gender dummy implies that 
women on average earn 38% less than men (1-exp(-0.481)).   28
 
Column 2 shows that when controlling for the level of education and experience the gender 
gap is reduced slightly, but women still earn 33% less than men. The reduction is small 
because education and experience are not very important for micro-entrepreneurs in 
Bolivia. The returns to an additional year of education are less than 3%, which is very 
small.  
 
Column 3 shows that when adding productive capital
38 and the number of employees, the 
gender gap drops substantially, and becomes statistically insignificant. This means that the 
33% gender gap calculated after controlling for education and experience can be entirely 
explained by differences in productive capital.  
 
Column 4 adds sectoral dummies, which causes the gender discrimination coefficient to 
turn positive, in favor of women, but statistically indifferent from 0. The further drop 
implies that women tend to choose sectors with relatively low level of returns (grocery 
stores, camelid products and clothes manufacturing). They also dominate food sales, which 
is a relatively attractive sector, however.  
 
Finally, Column 5 shows a full regression with additional variables that might be of 
interest. The gender gap has now turned even more in favor of women, although the 
coefficient is still not statistically significant. This means that the large gender gap observed 
in Column 1 is clearly not due to the sex of the owner per se, but can be explained 
principally by the lower scale of operation that are typical of female owned micro-
enterprises (less capital and less employees) as well as their choice of sector. Female micro-
entrepreneurs also have less education, but that does not appear to be a significant 
disadvantage for them.  
 
Column 5 also shows that firms that have used bank loans tend to be significantly more 
profitable, but the result does not say anything about causality. Most likely the result is due 
to reverse causality since it is only the most profitable firms that consider applying for and 
are granted bank loans. Micro credit does not seem to be related with productivity, possibly 
because many of the micro credit institutions consciously target the most disadvantaged 
population groups rather than the most profitable businesses. For example, Pro-Mujer’s 
target group is poor women, but they also sometimes lend to women who do not qualify as 
poor, and a comparison between the two groups show that the non-target group performs 
better than the target group (Gibb, 2007). 
 
Having a NIT (or being formal) does not seem to affect profitability once other factors 
(especially number of employees) are controlled for. The coefficient on the export dummy 
                                                 
38  The log of productive capital, excluding buildings and land but including the replacement cost of 
inventory. The reasons for the exclusion of land and buildings are that i) many firms operate out of their home 
so the value of these assets are also capturing home use; ii) since land and buildings don't appreciate, but are a 
source of investment in of themselves, they typically earn lower returns to the business than equipment and 
inventories; and iii) financing for equipment and inventories tends to differ from financing of buildings and 
land. 
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suggests that exporting firms are less profitable than non-exporting firms, but the difference 
is not statistically significant, although the coefficient is large. There is also a tendency for 
female dominated firms to be less profitable, but again the result is not statistically 
significant. 
 
Firms with an indigenous owner tend to be slightly more profitable than firms with a non-
indigenous owner, but the difference is not statistically significant. Businesses run by single 
women also tend to be slightly more profitable than businesses run by married or 
cohabiting women, but again the difference is not statistically significant. 
 
However, firms located in El Alto are substantially less profitable than firms located in La 
Paz, Santa Cruz or Cochabamba. This is likely because of the strong price competition in El 
Alto, with customers who, by necessity, worry more about price and quantity than quality 
and brands.  
 



















Woman (dummy)  -0.481  ***  -0.404 *** -0.146 -  0.031  -  0.171 - 
Education (years)      0.027 **  0.015 -  0.024  *  0.019 - 
Experience (years)      0.011 *  0.006 -  0.009  -  0.006 - 
ln(total assets)        0.084 ***  0.072  ***  0.054 ** 
Number of 
employees 
     0.100 ***  0.103 ***  0.101 *** 
Sector dummies 
 - Transport 
 - Grocery stores 
- Food sales 
- Wood products 
- Camelid 
products 
























Bank loans              0.272 ** 
Micro credit              0.066 - 
NIT             0.046 - 
Export             -0.473 - 
Share female 
employees 
          -0.351 - 
Indigenous owner              0.152 - 
Single woman              0.205 - 
Keeps accounts              0.103 - 
Location dummies 
 - Urban 
 - Santa Cruz 
 - Cochabamba 
 - El Alto  










Constant 1.429  ***  0.999 *** 0.449 **  0.556  **  0.172 - 













Notes:   Sample includes only businesses with less than 25 employees, entirely owned by the respondent from the World Bank 2007 
survey. 
*** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level, - Not significant. 
 
Why do female entrepreneurs operate on a smaller scale? One explanation is that they do 
not have the capital to expand, but another possible explanation is that they do not want to 
grow, because the business then would loose some of the features that make a micro-
business particularly attractive for women (not to depend on others, to be able to care for 
children simultaneously, flexible working hours, daily revenues). When asked about what 
they consider the ideal number of employees for their business five years into the future, 
the average for women is 6.9 compared to 9.2 for men. Single women are generally a bit 
more ambitious than married or cohabiting women (the first would on average like 5.3 
additional employees, whereas the latter only wants 4.2 extra employees), which suggests 
that family obligations may be one of the reasons why women prefer to keep their 
businesses at a relatively small scale. 
 
For grocery stores in particular, women have already reached what they consider the ideal 
size (2.8 employees, on average) and do not want additional employees. This is in contrast 
to men, who would like bigger stores with about 10 employees. Also, according to the 
micro-enterprise survey results, women have less confidence than men in their ability to 
hire and manage employees that are not family members.  
 
The most important reason why they prefer to operate on a small scale, however, is that it 
makes economic sense. From simple regressions using the 2007 micro and small business 
survey we find that the increase in monthly profits that would arise from a doubling of 
productive capital is less than 25% for all sectors. This implies that it would be 
considerably more profitable to open an identical twin business (yielding a 100% increase 
in profits) instead of expanding an existing one. 
 
This means that under current institutional arrangements, there are strongly diminishing 
returns to scale, and this applies to both men and women. Indeed, successful businesses 
often spawn additional small business run by spouses, children and other very close 
relatives
39.  This strategy has at least two important advantages compared to growing one 
larger business. First, the tax burden is considerably smaller for four small businesses than 
for one big business (if the small ones can be kept under the simplified tax regime, where 
they only have to pay a fixed monthly contribution). Second, the geographical dispersion of 
four small businesses allow them to capture a bigger market than one bigger store could.  
 
Table 5 shows estimated internal rates of return to a doubling of capital in each sector, by 
gender. The sectors which show high potential returns to a doubling of capital are the ones 
                                                 
39 Examples are abundant, especially in commerce and food sales. People are not happy to admit it due to the 
fear of taxation, but many small stores are just one of several within the family. In some cases, a family has 
one formal business and several informal ones, thus capturing the benefits of formality while still avoiding 
excessive taxation. For example, a woman who started selling goods out of a truck on a market place 15 years 
ago, now has three informal shops at the Mercado Achumani and one formal supermarket in San Miguel 
(Andy’s), all of them operated by family members. Unfortunately, the 2007 micro and small business survey 
do not contain information on other businesses in the family, and thus do not allow us to explore this topic 
more deeply.   31
where capital is currently a binding constraint (food sales for both men and women, and 
textile and camelid clothing for women). In contrast, the sectors with low or negative 
potential returns to additional capital do not experience capital constraints (transportation 
and grocery stores). Rather there seem to be an overinvestment in these sectors compared to 
what the market can bear. In each case, however, it would make more sense to invest in an 
additional business, rather than doubling the size of the existing business. Not even the 
productive sectors show increasing returns to scale. 
 
Table 5: Internal rates of return for a doubling of capital, by sector and gender 











Men 9%  -10%  4% 32% 2% 4% 
Women 27%  -13%  -7%  37%  4%  18% 
Source: Author’s estimation based on information in the 2007 micro and small enterprise survey. 
 
Why do women segregate themselves into certain, typically low paying, sectors? In food 
sales they have an obvious advantage arising from their much larger experience with food 
preparation. This sector requires relatively little investment and education, but yields 
relatively high profits, so it would seem a good choice for women. Grocery stores are 
attractive to women despite the long working hours and low salary, because they like not to 
depend on others (neither bosses nor employees), because they can simultaneously care for 
children, and because the business can grow slowly with minimum risk. The camelid 
product sector pays lower monthly profits than the other sectors, but women also dedicate 
much less time and capital to it, and have much lower levels of education, so this activity is 
likely considered complementary to domestic and agricultural activities. The clothes 
manufacturing sector is almost equally divided between male and female entrepreneurs, but 
women earn much less than men. Again this is due to the much smaller scale of operations. 
Women, on average, work 19 hours less than men each week, have invested less than a 
sixths of the capital, and have less than half the number of employees, so it is not strange 
that their monthly profits are also less than half those of men in the sector. The hourly wage 
is relatively high, though: at Bs. 7.5/hour it is higher than for women in any other sector 
than food sales (see Table 2 above), so given the typical time constraints of women, it is not 
a bad choice. 
 
Female entrepreneurs are more likely to hire women. In every single sector analyzed, 
female entrepreneurs tend to hire more women than their male counterparts. On average, 
for male entrepreneurs only 15% of employees are women, while for female entrepreneurs 
82% are women. This means that female entrepreneurs create a lot of jobs for women.  
 
 
5. Constraints to increased profitability 
 
The previous section indicated that scale of operation is the most important determinant of 
profitability. The more employees a business has the higher the profits of the owner. 
However, having many employees requires substantial investments of both money and 
time, and women have less of both than men. This particularly seems to be a constraint in  32
the clothes manufacturing sector, in food sales and in the camelid products sector, sectors in 
which women are concentrated. In contrast, there seems to have been an over-investment in 
the transport sector and in small grocery stores, to the extent that additional investments 
would yield negative returns.  
 
The latter two sectors operate in markets with almost completely fixed demand, which 
means that actions to increase supply might drive profits even further down. The urban 
transport sector, for example, is already so saturated that fares are being discounted far 
below the official tariffs, which means that profits are being squeezed. Rather than 
investing more in this sector, the only way to improve profits would be to withdraw a 
significant number of vehicles from circulation.  
 
The same problem exists among the small neighborhood grocery stores. If one more store 
opens up in a certain block, or if one existing store suddenly manages to sell twice as much, 
this is bound to have a negative effect on the other stores in the same block, as the demand 
for soft drinks, milk, bread, eggs, ice cream, and the like is very inelastic.  
 
The binding constraint in these two sectors is clearly demand, and without the possibility of 
increasing demand, improvements on the supply side are likely to further suppress profits, 
unless firms manage to find niche markets that were previously unserved. Individuals in the 
grocery store sector may be able to increase their profits through special efforts (more store 
space, promotions to attract costumers, exceptional customer service, etc.), but it will likely 
be at the expense of the competing store on the opposite corner. With fixed demand, it is 
basically a zero sum game, which severely reduces the scope for government interventions. 
For that reason, this section focuses on productivity constraints in the remaining 4 sectors, 
where there appears to be more room for productivity increases and increased supply.  
 
Constraints will be analyzed sector by sector, as each sector is fundamentally different from 
the others. The analysis is based on detailed information from the 2007 micro and small 
enterprise survey as well as on focus group meetings carried out by Encuestas & Estudios 
during February and June of 2007. 
 
 
A. The Clothes Manufacturing Sector 
 
The clothes manufacturing sector shows a bigger gender gap in profits than any of the other 
sectors. While female business owners obtain an average profit of Bs. 755 per months, men 
receive Bs. 2.063. As shown in Table 2, this is because women tend to operate on a much 
smaller scale than men. Women, on average, work 19 hours less than men each week, have 
invested less than a sixth of the capital, and have less than half the number of employees. 
More than 30% of female business owners in this sector do not own a single sewing 
machine, while this is the case for less than 5% of male owned enterprises.  
 
This is important to keep in mind, because whereas men operate relatively professional 
firms in this sector, a significant share of the women is knitting baby clothes on a part time 
basis without any machinery whatsoever. Still, the desire to expand is big, even among the 
most informal baby-clothes-knitting segment.  33
 
Actions to improve sales 
 
In the micro and small enterprise survey, business managers were asked which specific 
action could improve their sales, what this action would cost, and how much it would 
improve sales. In general, the actions to improve sales were more expensive for women in 
the clothes manufacturing sector than for men (Bs. 40,000 versus Bs. 27,000), but the 
expected returns were lower. Whereas men expected to recover their investment in 44 
months, on average, for women it was estimated to take 81 months
40.  
 
When asked about which action could improve sales, 30% of women answer “equipment” 
while this is the case for only 4% of men. This suggests that women are short of basic 
productive machinery. The average cost of the equipment they ask for is about Bs. 26,000 
(more than 3 times the productive capital they already have, excluding real estate), and they 
estimate that this would increase their sales by an average of 63%. If we assume that profits 
increase in the same proportion as sales, the average monthly benefit from this investment 
would be around Bs. 587. It would thus take about 44 months to pay back the initial 
investment, assuming 0% interest, and only thereafter would the firm start making an extra 
profit on the equipment. If the equipment functions for 6 years, the internal rate of return on 
the investment would be about 16%. 
 
Returns to the purchase of equipment are thus typically not high enough to warrant micro-
credit loans nor financing from the equipment seller. Indeed, less than 5% of firms in this 
sector has made any use of micro-credit, and supplier financing is almost unheard of. Bank 
loans would be more feasible and are also more common: 19% of women and 28% of men 
have made use of them. But the majority of financing comes from the owner’s private 
savings. 
 
The possibility exists that financing is not the real problem, but rather a lack of supply of 
industrial equipment. This has been mentioned in qualitative interviews, but it does not 
explain the differences between men and women. In addition, there is a specific street in La 
Paz (Isaac Tamayo) where all inputs into the production of clothes, including equipment, 
can be bought at very reasonable prices. According to focus group interviews carried out by 
Encuestas & Estudios (2007), participants did not feel that they could get better input prices 
by importing themselves or buying directly from producers. El Alto also has very good 
metal engineers capable of copying machinery, and fixing broken equipment. Supposedly, 
the supply of inputs represents much more of a problem in Cochabamba, but this does not 
seem to have an adverse effect on profits, since Cochabamba has by far the highest level of 





This sector is very much focused on the domestic market and thus suffers from the 
competition from the big used clothes business. As one business woman in Cochabamba 
                                                 
40 Assuming that profits increase in the same proportion as sales.  34
answered when asked about her dreams for the future: “I wish we would return to how it 
was before all the used clothes arrived.”
41 
 
Data from the survey of micro- and small enterprises show a very large variation in sales 
prices. For example, a set of baby clothes is sold at prices anywhere between Bs. 10 and 
100, with Bs. 25 being the most common. This suggests ample room for experimenting 
with variations in quality and design. Well designed clothes do not necessarily cost more to 
produce than bad designs, but they obviously sell much better, and could thus help increase 
profits. Several NGO’s have also figured this out, and thus offer design courses and 
assistance (mostly in El Alto and La Paz, though). Focus group interviews reveal a strong 
demand for training in design. 
 
Design is pretty much a public good though - quickly copied by the competition - so any 
single producer is unlikely to invest a significant amount of money in design. Most 
producers, however, do pay close attention to what sells well among the competition, and 
organize production accordingly. 
 
 
B. The Food Sales Sector 
 
The food sales sector is very much dominated by women, but the few men found in the 
business do exceptionally well – better than in any other sector (average hourly wage of Bs. 
13.8 versus an average of Bs. 8.3 for men), despite the low level of assets invested (about 
Bs. 17,000 compared to 65,000 for the average male owned business in the sample) (see 
Table 2). 
 
Women do not do quite as well, but they still do better than in any other sector (average 
hourly wage of Bs. 8.6 versus an average of Bs. 6.5 for women). 
 
The sector is very heterogeneous, ranging from the ones with almost no infrastructure who 
brings very cheap lunches to regular clients at their place of work (construction workers, 
police men, street sellers, etc) via specialized food stalls selling one specific plate (for 
example roasted chicken with rice) to full-fledged restaurants offering a variety of plates 
for both lunch and dinner. Among the sample in the 2007 survey, the number of clients on a 
normal day varies between 8 and 1050, and the prices charged for a typical lunch vary 
between Bs. 1 and Bs. 25. Monthly sales vary between Bs. 240 and Bs. 275,000. 
 
Businesses run by women are generally quite efficient, serving an average of 126 customers 
per day with an average of 2.6 employees. Businesses run by men only serve an average of 
108 clients, although they have 4.9 employees on average. But male run businesses charge 
their clients about 20% higher prices, and thus manage to get higher profits. The latter are 
also much more likely to be formal, with 58% having a NIT (compared to only 22% of 
women). 
 
                                                 
41 Focus group meeting carried out by Encuestas & Estudios in June 2007.  35
Salaries in this sector vary wildly. A paid cook could get anywhere between Bs. 100 and 
Bs. 2000 per month, while a sales person would be paid somewhere between Bs. 50 and Bs. 
900 per month. Focus group interviews reveal that managing employees is a big problem in 
this sector. Once they have learned the trade, they quit and start up their own competing 
business
42. The low wage jobs in this sector are thus often considered a kind of 
apprenticeship, which is the way most people learn the trade. Few people have used formal 
training or taken classes in cooking, although focus group participants express a strong 
demand for cooking classes. Especially women in this sector have very low levels of formal 
education (8.5 years on average compared to 12.7 years for men).  
 
Women in this sector also noted how their husbands’ jealousy makes it difficult to provide 
the service needed to build up a loyal client base. Some said they had ended up in hospital 
for being ‘too nice’ to clients.
43 This is an example of how gender-based violence affect 
earnings not only through its health impacts. According to INE (2005) nearly 10 percent of 
women in Bolivia report being beaten regularly, while more than 50 percent report 
occasional physical and sexual abuse. 
 
Finally, the street vendors complain about harassment from police and municipal 
inspectors. Formality would help avoid such harassment, but the lowest end of this sector 




Actions to improve sales 
  
For both men and women, the most important constraint for sales is their infrastructure. 
When asked about which action could improve their sales close to a third responded “better 
infrastructure”. Women on average needed about Bs. 22,000 to make improvements, 
whereas men on average demanded Bs. 163,000. Both expected a resulting increase in sales 
of 58%. Assuming that profits would increase in the same proportion, women would on 
average expect to recover their desired investment in infrastructure in about 41 months, 
whereas it would take men an average of 140 months. We thus have the opposite situation 
than in clothes manufacturing, where men’s investments appeared to carry higher returns. 
 
If an infrastructure investment could pay itself back in 41 months, this would justify a bank 
loan. About 24% of women and 16% of men in this sector have made use of bank loans, 
which implies that women in this sector do not have more difficult access to bank financing 
than men, despite their much lower level of education. 
 
Although qualitative interviews with people in the sector suggest that competition is 
ferocious, it is clearly less of a constraint than among grocery stores and in the transport 
sector. Profits are relatively high, especially considering the low level of investment and 
education required, and demand is much more elastic than in the other sectors. Investments 
                                                 
42 Encuestas & Estudios (2007). 
43 Focus group interviews carried out by Encuestas & Estudios in Cochabamba and Santa Cruz during June of 
2007. 
44 According to focus group interviews carried out by Encuestas & Estudios in June of 2007.  36
appear to give a better return than in any of the other sectors (see Table 3), and investments 
are not very risky, given that they would be mainly in infrastructure, which is unlikely to 
loose its value even if the business fails to be profitable. 
 
Women at the lowest end of this sector (mobile food sellers) are not very optimistic about 
the chances of improving their profits, and would be happy to accept a paid job in another 
sector, if they could find one. This is in contrast to women in the lower end of the textile 
and camelid clothing sectors who strongly prefer to continue doing what they are doing, but 
preferably on a slightly larger scale with a bit more help. The difference may be that the 
mobile food sellers spend a lot of time on the street, exposed to harsh weather, unpleasant 
customers, and harassing officials, while the seamstresses and knitters work in the comfort 




C. The Wood Products Sector 
 
The wood products sector is very heterogeneous, including firms who make furniture, doors 
and windows as well as small artisans who make wooden toys, puzzles and souvenirs. 
 
The sector is very much dominated by men with 90% of managers and 89% of all workers 
being male. Out of the 6 sectors investigated, it is the one that most heavily relies on unpaid 
family workers (18% of all workers compared to an average of 15% across all sectors). 
Only about 8% of all firms in the sector are engaged in exports, and only one out of 100 
exports more than half of its production. Exporting firms are relatively big with an average 
of 17 employees, while the firms that cater only to the domestic market have an average of 
5 employees. The difference in productive assets is even bigger with exporting firms having 
about 7 times more productive capital than non-exporting firms. Two thirds of exporting 
firms have a NIT, while this is only the case for one fourth of non-exporting firms.
 46  
 
Not even the biggest firms produce furniture in series. Almost everything is custom made 
to the specifications of the client, which in the domestic market almost always is the final 
consumer.
47 The quality varies enormously with a dining table for six persons being sold at 
anywhere between Bs. 120 and Bs. 18,000.  
 
 
Actions to improve sales 
 
Since there are so few women in this sector, it is impossible to do a gender differentiated 
analysis of the constraints to growth in this sector. According to the surveyed managers, the 
main constraint is productive capital (mentioned by 39% of respondents) and lack of 
customers (21%)
48. The returns to a doubling of capital is estimated to be very low, 
                                                 
45 According to focus group interviews carried out by Encuestas & Estudios during June 2007. 
46 According to the 2007 micro and small business survey. 
47 According to focus group interviews carried out by Encuestas & Estudios during February 2007. 
48 According to the 2007 micro and small business survey.  37
however (see Table 5 above), which means that capital is probably not the most binding 
constraint.  
 
Focus group meetings put much more stress on the irregular and bad quality of the wood 
that is left for the domestic market after all the best wood has been extracted and prepared 
for exports. The low quality of workers is also a concern with managers complaining that 




D. The Camelid Products Sector 
 
This sector is by far the most informal of the sectors investigated. Among the micro and 
small firms surveyed only 9% of firms in the camelid products sector had a tax 
identification number (NIT) compared to 27% across all sectors. The firms in this sector are 
also generally smaller than in any of the other sectors, with an average number of 
employees of 3.2. Half of the businesses have no or only one employees. Many of the 
businesses are so informal that basic information about sales and monthly profits are 
missing, which means that only 56% of the surveyed firms in this sector could be included 
in the regression analysis in the previous section.
50 
 
The sector is very much dominated by women, with 80% of managers and 76% of all 
workers female. The managers in this sector have been in business for an average of 16 
years, compared to 10 years across all sectors, which means that the businesses are 
extremely stable, despite the very low level of profits. Exports are more common than in 
any of the other sectors, but still only 16% are engaged in exports. This sector makes less 
use of bank loans than any other sector (only 13% have obtained a bank loan for their 
business compared to 23% across all sectors).
51 
 
The number of different products is quite limited, but the quality varies enormously. For a 
shawl (manta), the producers receive anywhere between Bs. 20 and Bs. 3500, and the price 
of a scarf can vary between Bs. 5 and Bs. 1600. The most expensive products are generally 




Actions to improve sales 
 
When asked about what action could improve sales, respondents in the 2007 micro and 
small business survey most frequently responded “more sales”, which is not a very helpful 




                                                 
49 Focus group meetings carried out by Encuestas & Estudios during February 2007. 
50 According to the 2007 micro and small business survey. 
51 According to the 2007 micro and small business survey. 
52 According to the 2007 micro and small business survey. 
53 Carried out by Encuestas & Estudios in La Paz and El Alto during the months of February and June 2007.   38
Markets are considered a main problem and a problem which each individual person cannot 
do much about alone. Respondents highlight the competition from Peru, which has 
implemented a national policy of support to the sector, including industrialization and 
improvements of the quality and variety of the yarn, design, and the opening of export 
markets.  
 
Bolivians complain that it is very difficult to compete with the Peruvians because the 
quality of the raw material is so low in Bolivia. In addition, Bolivian producers have very 
low capacity due to the lack of good quality industrial machines, which means that they 
cannot produce the large series of homogeneous quality that are demanded by international 
markets. 
 
The lack of machines is not due to a lack of supply. Respondents state that it is easy enough 
to find adequate machinery, but that their very limited sales do not justify such an 
investment. They expressed a strong desire to receive training directly related to export. 
 
In contrast, there was a strong criticism of existing training courses: 
 
a)  Most courses are given by microcredit institutions, and “they are designed to 
respond to the needs of the finance industry rather than our businesses”. That is, the 
courses are oriented towards debt repayment rather than improving the productivity 
of the borrower. 
b)  There are motivational problems: “We only assist because it is compulsory.” 
c)  And problems with format and contents: “Most courses are theoretical.” “One learns 
very little.” 
d)  Also, there is no continuity: “We have been taught, but nobody has helped us put 
the lessons into practice.” 
e)  And lessons have not been applied: “I did pass an accounting course, but I still 
prefer just to use my notebook.” 
 
In contrast to other sectors, this sector demands political interventions rather than just 
economic support. In particular: 
 
a)  A ban on the importing of used clothes and thus a strengthening of the local market. 
b)  An active export policy and the opening of international markets. 
c)  Support to the yarn industry, in order to secure a steady supply of high quality 
inputs.  
d)  Training in design, business management and how to start exporting. 
 
Rather than banning the import of used clothes, which would hurt the large number of 
people operating in the used clothes sector, as well as the consumers, it would be preferable 
to initiate more pro-active policies to support this sector. The Fashion District Initiative in 





Box 4: The Fashion District Initiative in Johannesburg 
 
The Johannesburg “Fashion District Initiative” is the city’s strategy for integrating a cluster of 
informal garment enterprises into the formal economy based around the provision of storage and 
office space to informal firms in a specially designated ‘fashion district’. The district covers 20 
city blocks and the initiative has involved some 1,000 clothing micro-manufacturers. In addition 
to offices and storage space, the city also gave the firms training and advice on marketing and 
business development. Interventions took the form of a partnership between the city, provincial 
and national government, the private sector and a tertiary training institution. Activities included 
training, the development of a training centre, the formation of a production network and an 
operators association.  
 
Evaluations based on a controlled comparison found that the interventions led to higher levels of 
output and employment, as well as product diversification and competitive upgrading. The 
supported firms have developed a focus on niche markets, penetrating new markets both locally 
and even internationally. The output of firms involved in the initiative increased significantly and 
employment opportunities were also increased. Some estimates say more than 1,000 jobs have 
been created. Networking between firms also increased while out-sourcing and integration of 
migrant workers has been encouraged 
. 
The main lessons for policymakers from the Johannesburg experience are that: 
  Local government need to provide explicit policy and strategy support  
  Identification and entry into niche markets is key for small entrepreneurs to survive in a 
competitive market environment 
  Training is also key for small firms to compete efficiently in new markets 
  Collective efficiencies are worth tapping into 
 




6. Conclusions and policy recommendations 
 
Most Bolivians live on a very tight budget of just a few dollars per day, which means that 
they have to buy food, clothes, furniture, transportation and other basic items as cheaply as 
possible. This means that the suppliers of these goods and services have to compete on 
prices. A complete lunch can be served for as little as Bs. 1,- (13 cents), and you can ride in 
a minibus for hours for Bs. 2.30. Clothes are extremely cheap due to the flood of used 
clothes, and a dining table can be found for as little as Bs. 120,- ($15). 
 
With such fierce price competition, profits are driven down to a bare minimum, and the 
only way to increase profits is to target another market. There are basically three options: 
the richest quintile within Bolivia, exports, or tourists. The richest quintile within Bolivia 
generally demands facturas and thus encourages formalization, but tourists do not, and 
large parts of exports are also done informally (contrabando). 
 
Several of the sectors studied do not have the option of exporting (transportation, grocery 
stores and food sales), so their only option for increasing profits is to move up the ladder  40
and target a richer segment of the domestic market. This, in general, will require 
investments in real estate and equipment as well as formalization.  
 
The remaining sectors (clothing from textiles or camelid wool and wood products) all have 
the potential for and desire to export, but find it extremely complicated under current 
conditions. Exports are complicated by Bolivia’s landlockedness, high transport costs, and 
frequent blocking of main roads (Andersen & Nina 2007). Apart from the geographical 
constraints, entrepreneurs are also hindered by a lack of knowledge about how to export 
and a perception that the bureaucratic requirements to obtain a license to export are 
insurmountable. 
 
There is one additional market, namely tourists, which in reality is an export market, but 
which does not suffer the same complications as goods exports. Entrepreneurs that target 
this market do not have to worry about export permits and high transportation costs, as the 
tourists come to them instead. At the moment, however, the country does not fully benefit 
from its enormous potential in this sector. This is a pity as it is a very labor intensive sector 
with strong linkages to almost all other sectors in the economy. Not only does this sector 
create many opportunities for micro and small businesses, it also offers many opportunities 





Three main policy recommendations arise from this study, all of which cut across all 
sectors and apply universally: 
 
1)  Increase the benefits and reduce the costs of becoming formal.  
 
The most useful benefit seems to be the provision of subsidized credit to firms that 
have a NIT, possibly limited to productive sectors. The interest rate should be 
reasonable (6 - 8% per year), the borrowing period sufficiently long to be attractive 
for productive sectors (2-5 years), and the bureaucratic requirements minimal (a 
personal ID, a NIT, tax reports for the last 3 months, a simple business plan, and a 
realistic budget). According to the Supreme Decree No. 28421 of October 2005, 
sub-national governments can use part of the resources from the IDH (Direct Tax on 
Hydrocarbons) to stimulate productive activities, and subsidised credit could be one 
such stimulus. The Federation of Municipal Associations (FAM) in Bolivia is 
planning the development of a fund for productive development which could be 
used as a point of departure for a policy of subsidized credit at the municipal level.  
 
Another attractive option is to provide free training courses for firms with a NIT. 
Practical courses that take entrepreneurs through all the steps of making a business 
plan, of setting up an accounting system, or of becoming an exporter, would be 
much in demand, for example. 
 
These benefits should be independent, as the people who need credit are not 
necessarily the same as the ones who need training.   41
 
Such initiatives would encourage firms to become formal, and the benefits would be 
particularly valuable for women, who are more credit constrained than men and 
more in need of training that can compensate for the schooling they didn’t receive 
when they were younger. 
 
At the same time as the benefits of becoming formal are increased, the bureaucratic 
costs should be reduced. There are already many initiatives under way with that 
purpose, but they are struggling and uncoordinated
54. The aim should be broaden 
the tax-base at the same time as the tax- and administrative burdens of formal firms 
are reduced. 
 
Once a better balance between benefits and costs of formality have been created, a 
formalization campaign can be launched. In Peru, for example, the Ministry of 
Work and Employment Promotion has a program called “MI EMPRESA”, which 
helps micro- and small enterprises become formal and get access to training, 




2)  Make tourism a national priority. 
 
This involves a very wide range of initiatives, from tourist infrastructure (roads, 
airports, public toilets, parks, hiking trails, maps and markings of attractions, etc.) to 
teaching foreign languages in school. Efforts to crack down on the things that scare 
off tourists (crime, road blocks, trash and uncleanliness) would also be important.   
 
Almost all the initiatives that stimulate tourism are also beneficial for the local 
population by themselves, but if they succeed in attracting substantially more, and 
richer, tourists, it could have a very beneficial effect on employment and incomes 
for both skilled and unskilled people in a wide variety of sectors.  
 
Adventure tourism and eco-tourism are particularly fast-growing niches, where 
Bolivia has a strong comparative advantage, due to the impressive number and 
diversity of natural and cultural attractions. When it comes to adventure tourism, a 
difficult geography suddenly becomes an advantage rather than a problem. 
 
The stimulation of the tourist industry would be expected to benefit men and 
women almost equally, perhaps with a slight advantage to women, who are 
overrepresented in the hotel, restaurant, and handicraft sectors. On the other hand, 
men are overrepresented in the transportation and construction sectors which will 
                                                 
54 For example, in 2002 the Inter-American Development Bank financed a project at FUNDEMPRESA with 
the purpose of simplifying the steps to set up and shut down an enterprise 
(http://www.fundempresa.org.bo/simplifica.htm). The Superintendency of Enterprises has recently signed a 
contract with CAF with the same objective (personal communication with Addy Suxo, Economic Advisor at 
the Superinendency of Enterprises, 20 June 2007). 
55 Folder published in 2007 by the Ministerio de Trabajo y Promoción del Empleo: “MI EMPRESA: 
Formalización y Desarrollo de Micro y Pequeñas Empresas: ¡Pon a caminar tu propia empresa!”  42
also benefit greatly from an increase in tourism.  
 
3)  Modernize labor laws 
 
The current labor laws in Bolivia date back to 1942 and are particularly outdated in 
the treatment of women, who are classified together with children under the age of 
18 in Chapter 6 of the General Labor Law. Women are thus extra protected 
compared to men. For example, women (and children) are not allowed to work 
more than 40 hours per week, are not allowed to work at night (in industry), cannot 
do strenuous, dangerous, unhealthy or immoral work.
56 More importantly, firms are 
required to pay for 90 days of maternity leave (more in case of complications) with 
full salary and at least one hour of breast feeding every day as long as the child is 
breast feeding. A woman cannot be fired while pregnant or during the first year 
after child birth
57. Enterprises with more than 50 female workers are required to 
maintain baby care facilities with qualified personnel approved by the Labor 
Ministry.
58 Such laws are obviously meant to help and protect women, but they 
have the unfortunate side effect of making female workers less attractive for formal 
firms, which helps explain both why there are fewer women in the formal private 
sector, and why they tend to earn less than men.  
 
One way to correct this imbalance is if the government assumes the cost of 
maternity leave instead of the firm, or alternatively, the cost could be shared 
between the firm, the government, and the employee.  
 
Often women themselves are discouraged from working in the formal sector 
because the work is too inflexible to be compatible with child rearing and other 
family obligations. This problem could be helped by offering free public child care 
to formal sector employees and owners of formal enterprises. This would also create 
an additional incentive to becoming formal.  
 
Apart from those three general recommendations, the study proposes the following sector 
specific recommendations: 
 
1)  Products made from camelid wool 
 
This sector has a comparative advantage and considerable export potential due to 
privileged access to the raw material. However, the processing of the wool into yarn 
is currently too artesanal, leading to a low quality of inputs for manufacturing. 
Indeed, much wool is currently exported to Peru, where it is industrialized in a 
professional manner leading to a good quality of yarn in a large variety of colors. 
Bolivian manufacturers who need good quality raw materials have to import the 
Peruvian yarn
59.  
                                                 
56 Ley General de Trabajo (8 December 1942)  
57 Decreto Ley No. 13214 of 24 December 1988. 
58 Decreto Supremo No. 224 of 23 August 1943. 
59 According to focus group interviews carried out by Encuestas & Estudios in February and June of 2007.  43
 
It would make sense for Bolivia to develop its own wool processing industry, 
instead of having to export the raw material and import the processed yarn. 
Incidentally, the development of the camelid sector would also have beneficial 
effects for the production of Quinua Real, which is a particularly nutritious cereal 
which grows only in Bolivia, and which depends on fertilization from camelids.
60 
 
Apart from exports, the camelid products sector also extensively targets tourists, 
and would thus benefit from a general boost to the tourist industry. Indeed, it was 
this sector that complained most that tourists are being scared away by the filthiness 
and political unrest in Bolivia.
61 
 
As women dominate this sector, women would benefit disproportionately from 
initiatives to advance this sector. 
  
2)  Textile clothing 
 
This sector does not appear to have much export potential. It is an extremely 
competitive sector worldwide, and Bolivia does not have privileged access to 




Indeed, in Bolivia this sector mainly operates out of private homes, and women like 
the sector exactly because of that, because it allows them to take care of domestic 
responsibilities at the same time.
63 
 
The sector has been somewhat depressed by the inflow of used clothes with which it 
is difficult to compete. A ban on used clothes would thus help the sector, but that 
would be at the expense of the used clothes sector and the consumers, and it is not 
clear that a ban would be socially beneficial. 
 
Access to credit at reasonable terms would be beneficial for many micro 
entrepreneurs in this sector, as expected returns to additional investments are high. 
This would likely make some firms substantially more productive, possibly driving 
the least productive out of business, and thus increasing overall productivity in the 
sector.  
 
3)  Food sales 
 
This sector by definition has no export potential, but there is still a lot of room for 
improving profitability simply by targeting richer customers, including tourists. The 
                                                 
60 According to a study being carried out by Juan Christobal Birbuet for the Camara de Comercio. No 
document available yet. 
61 According to focus group interviews carried out by Encuestas & Estudios in June of 2007. 
62 Despite this there are of course examples of successful textile firms, which have found lucrative niches in 
both the domestic and international markets. 
63 According to focus group interviews carried out by Encuestas & Estudios in June of 2007.  44
binding constraint is capital, and expected returns are very high, indeed higher than 
in any of the other sectors studied. Access to credit at reasonably terms would thus 
be very beneficial for this sector. If micro entrepreneurs obtain the credit they need 
to grow and target richer market segments, they will not object to formalization.
64  
 
Two additional ways of helping this sector would be free cooking classes and the 
organization of food festivals. 
 
Finally, the street vendors complain about harassment from police and municipal 
inspectors. Formality would help avoid such harassment, but the lowest end of this 
sector feels that their modest profits would be lost if they were to become formal.
65 
Instead of being harassed, this sector should receive help to sign up under the 
simplified tax-regime and to obtain their municipal license. 
 
Women would benefit much more than men from initiatives to help this sector, both 
because the sector is dominated by women and because women would expect higher 
returns to additional capital. 
 
4)  Grocery stores 
 
This sector is constrained by an almost fixed domestic demand, which means that 
there is very limited growth potential for the sector as a whole. There has already 
been an overinvestment in this sector to the extent that returns to both labor and 
capital are extremely low and further investments would have negative returns.  
 
Despite the very low incomes, especially women like this sector. For some it is an 
alternative to staying isolated at home all day, a chance to socialize with neighbors, 
while for others it provides welcome daily incomes to cover daily expenses, which 
are considered necessary as a complement to the husband’s income that arrives only 
once a month. This sector is much richer than the other sectors and has certain 
financial flexibility as they can run inventories up and down according to the 
fluctuating needs of the family.
66 
 
This sector does not expect any help from the government
67, and this report 
recommends no interventions in this sector. 
 
5)  The transport sector 
 
This sector is similar to the grocery store sector in the sense that demand is fixed 
and there has been an overinvestment in the sector causing returns to capital and 
labor to drop to very low levels. 
 
                                                 
64 According to focus group interviews carried out by Encuestas & Estudios in June of 2007. 
65 According to focus group interviews carried out by Encuestas & Estudios in June of 2007. 
66 According to focus group interviews carried out by Encuestas & Estudios in June of 2007. 
67 According to focus group interviews carried out by Encuestas & Estudios in June of 2007.  45
In contrast to the grocery store business, this sector has many clashes with the 
government. The sector is vital for the economy, and often uses its strategic position 
to make demands on the government. It has, for example, managed to secure 
subsidized fuel prices, and it violently resists the government’s attempts to 
introduce some much needed regulations. The quality of the fleet is extremely low, 
there is a pragmatic disregard for ordinary traffic rules, cars are overfilled (five 
adult passengers and just as many kids can be squeezed into an ordinary car besides 
the driver) and drivers work so many hours without breaks that safety is 
compromised. 
 
But apart from that it is a blessing for customers. It would be difficult to find a more 
efficient public transportation system anywhere in the world, in the sense that rides 
pass by with very high frequency (every few seconds) and fares are very low. There 
is a variety of price/speed/comfort combinations, so that customers can choose 
according to personal preferences and money/time constraints. 
 
Theoretically, some minimum technical requirements could be implemented and 
enforced in order to weed out the worst offenders and thus improve safety and air 
quality. But such measures would be met with strong resistance causing many 
strikes, blockades and lost working days for the general population. 
 
General infrastructure investments, both in urban and rural areas, would help this 
sector by reducing congestion and making long-distance buses a feasible alternative 
to expensive flights.  
 
6)  The wood products sector 
 
This sector has tremendous export potential due to Bolivia’s large tropical forest 
reserves, which create a clear comparative advantage. It has been estimated that 
Bolivia currently exploits less than 3% of the wood volume that could be 
sustainably harvested in Bolivia.
68 The diversity of wood species is often considered 
a disadvantage, however, as production processes are unique to each species. 
 
The wood manufacturing sector suffers from problems similar to the camelid sector, 
as most of the raw material is exported leaving only leftovers for the domestic 
industry. Furniture manufacturers complain about the low and inconsistent quality 
of their inputs, often resorting to imported compressed wood instead.
69 
 
Like in the camelid products sector, this sector would benefit from a professional 
industry that processes the raw material efficiently, creating standardized and 
certified units that can be used in serial production, and using leftovers to produce 
compressed wood units that are even easier to use in serial production. 
                                                 
68 According to BOLFOR (http://www.bolfor.org/contenido_ing/perfil_forestal.asp), Bolivia’s sustained 
timber production potential exceeds 20 million m
3 yearly, while actual timber extraction only amounts to 
about 0.5 million m3 annually (Superintendencia Forestal 2002). 
69 Encuestas & Estudios (2007).  46
 
Since men dominate this sector, initiatives to advance this sector would likely 
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